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Abstract: Decades of voluntary efforts to reduce agricultural nonpoint source 
pollution have been ineffective at protecting water quality worldwide. While 
farmer collective action is needed to deal with the geographical extent of dif-
fuse pollution from nutrient runoff, theoretical expectations from commons gov-
ernance research predicts that farmers will not protect water quality since they 
have few incentives to do so. These different factors indicate that compulsory 
approaches are needed. However, the commons literature has tended to overlook 
the constructive roles that government regulation can play. Research on why farm-
ers adopt on-farm conservation measures similarly has failed to explore farmer 
cooperation, instead focusing mainly on financial motivations of farmers. Yet, 
some adoption research indicates that social norms are essential factors shaping 
(non)adoption, but which are largely overlooked by existing agri-environmental 
policies. This study examines the important gap of how government regulations 
can incentivise farmer  cooperation to improve water quality. I focus on a case 
study of the Florida Everglades, where farmers face joint liability under a phos-
phorus pollution cap and which has resulted in improvements in water quality 
over the past 20 years. Farms’ drainage disrupts the oligotrophic conditions of 
the Florida Everglades, but water quality has steadily improved since regula-
tions began in 1994. However, the regulations set compliance jointly for farmers, 
devolving responsibility to ensure sufficient adoption of conservation practices 
and deal with free riding. While state monitoring shows that collectively farms 
have improved water quality, we do not know whether participation is widespread 
or concentrated among a few large farms. This study provides the first analysis 
of farm-level water quality outcomes for this area and how judicial, legislative, 
and local institutions interact to encourage farmer cooperation. Results show 
that a large majority of farms have improved their water quality, demonstrating 
that collective action has been a key element in the outcome. At the same time, 
poor-performing farms reveal the shortcomings of joint compliance. I end by 
Compelling collective action 379
 discussing the  implications of how individual and collective requirements can 
provide  farmers with valuable information while also drawing on farmer social 
dynamics to encourage greater participation.
Keywords: Agri-environmental governance, conservation adoption, farmer 
 collective action, nonpoint source pollution, social-ecological system
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1. Introduction
Water quality impairment from agricultural nonpoint source (NPS) pollution 
remains a pressing governance challenge worldwide (Carpenter et al. 1998; 
Patterson 2017). Similar to other common-pool resource (CPR) dilemmas, the 
challenge of preventing farms’ NPS pollution from harming shared waterways is 
exceptionally difficult (Smith and Porter 2010). Widespread adoption of on-farm 
conservation measures to limit soil erosion, nutrient runoff, and drainage, often 
called best management practices (BMPs), are essential to restore the health of 
impaired waterways (Daroub et al. 2011). While this dilemma is widely under-
stood, government-led efforts to encourage BMP adoption are mostly voluntary 
and have failed to generate sufficient participation to improve water quality 
(Barnes et al. 2013; Ribaudo 2015; Leventon et al. 2017). Alongside biodiversity 
loss and climate change, the spatial extent of NPS pollution means that wide-
spread collective action is necessary to address the problem.
While widespread cooperation is lacking, achieving sufficient BMP adoption 
through regulations also appears to be problematic. Existing research demon-
strates that farmers remain unconvinced of their farm’s contribution to down-
stream impairment, despite mandatory BMP adoption (Macgregor and Warren 
2006; Barnes et al. 2009). Requirements can fuel a sense of unfairness rather 
than desired management changes (Barnes et al. 2013). Farmers dislike regula-
tions in part because of perceived inflexibility, lack of autonomy, and additional 
bureaucratic hassles and costs that come with prescriptive requirements (Emery 
and Franks 2012; Taylor and Van Grieken 2015). Even where farmers participate 
in collaborative governance, efforts can focus on improving public opinion or 
protecting agricultural interests ahead of improving water quality (Prokopy et al. 
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2014; de Loë et al. 2015; de Krom 2017). Cooperation is difficult to achieve 
because NPS pollution is a complex and contested environmental challenge that 
features significant ambiguity around how much individuals contribute to the 
overall problem, many stakeholders and competing priorities, and multiple levels 
of governance to coordinate (Cash et al. 2006; Patterson 2017).
The commons literature has largely overlooked the challenge of agricultural 
NPS pollution (Kerr 2007), despite extensive insights into how natural resource 
users can cooperate to avoid environmental degradation (Ostrom 1990; Dietz 
et al. 2003). Since farmers rarely face the consequences of downstream water 
quality impairment, a theoretical challenge is to understand how to generate wide-
spread BMP adoption in the absence of local, mutually experienced feedbacks 
that can encourage cooperation to avoid environmental degradation (Stern 2011; 
Patterson 2017). In addressing large-scale environmental problems, one influen-
tial research approach has been the principle of subsidiarity in nested governance 
arrangements, where some rights and responsibilities are devolved to natural 
resource users. In contrast to centralized control, devolving some responsibilities 
can improve government’s access to local knowledge, benefit from community-
based self-monitoring and enforced trust, gain disaggregated feedback on rule 
performance, and reduce enforcement costs by improving legitimacy from local 
participation in rulemaking (Marshall 2008). However, commons research has 
tended to focus on subsidiarity in cases where local resource users gain liveli-
hood benefits. This paper, in contrast, examines subsidiarity dynamics when live-
lihoods incentives for protecting ecosystem health are absent or weak.
To deal with agricultural NPS pollution, one potential way forward is for 
government regulations to incentivize collective action by employing collec-
tive, rather than individual, subsidies and penalties. There is limited but grow-
ing attention to collective agri-environmental approaches, though many studies 
have focused on biodiversity conservation rather than NPS pollution. Collective 
approaches may offer several advantages that are similar to subsidiarity: atten-
tion to social norms and reciprocity by encouraging farmer-to-farmer interaction 
(Marshall 2004; Burton and Paragahawewa 2011); reduced transaction costs for 
coordination and increased participation by devolving some responsibilities to 
trustworthy non-governmental intermediaries, such as agricultural cooperatives 
(Marshall 2008; Dedeurwaerdere et al. 2015); and improved legitimacy for BMP 
adoption with greater flexibility and farmer input into how to meet environmental 
goals (Emery and Franks 2012; Del Corso et al. 2017). This study’s focus on regu-
lations complements calls in the commons literature for greater attention to the 
various roles that government can play to encourage behavioral change (Koontz 
et al. 2004; Anthony and Campbell 2011; Mansbridge 2014).
This paper contributes to the literature by examining how state regulations 
relying on collective penalties and devolved implementation responsibilities can 
encourage farmer cooperation to improve water quality. It does so through a case 
study of the Florida Everglades, which stands out as an uncommon success story 
of greatly improved water quality (SFWMD 2017) under mandatory BMP adop-
tion. While it appears that regulations drive water quality improvements, nested 
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governance arrangements make farmer cooperation a critical question. The 1994 
Everglades Forever Act relies on a shared phosphorus pollution cap, which is 
backed by court-mandated water quality standards. Farmers in the Everglades 
Agricultural Area (EAA), whose drainage water flows south into the Everglades, 
face joint liability to annually maintain their collective total phosphorus (TP) 
load 25% below a pre-regulatory baseline level. Over 22 years, EAA farms have 
averaged annual TP loads 55% below their baseline, maintaining compliance in 
every year (Davison et al. 2017). Water quality in the Everglades has improved 
as a result, with more than 90% of monitoring sites meeting restoration goals of 
phosphorus concentrations at or below 10 parts per billion (ppb) (SFWMD 2017).
However, no research has examined whether devolving the responsibility TP 
load reductions to EAA farms has led to collective action to curb potential free 
riding. Since there are no individual penalties as long as the group maintains com-
pliance, the outcome could reflect the efforts of a few large players. Moreover, 
the shared pollution cap is overseen by the state government but overlaps with 
both federal court-backed water quality standards of 10 ppb and EAA agricul-
tural drainage management shaped by hundreds of shared canals and pumps. I 
address two research questions to examine why water quality has improved in 
the Florida Everglades. First, in what ways do the nested judicial, legislative, and 
local drainage institutions incentivize cooperation? Second, given those nested 
governance arrangements, does the shared pollution cap under the Everglades 
Forever Act result in widespread improvements or permit substantial free riding? 
This paper provides the first analysis of farm-level TP loads in the EAA, despite 
more than 20 years of publicly available data. After identifying the relevant insti-
tutional arrangements from 65 semi-structured interviews and analyzing TP load 
outcomes from state records, I discuss the importance and relevance of collective 
regulatory incentives for addressing agricultural NPS pollution in other contexts.
2. Farmer cooperation and governance challenges for  agricultural 
NPS pollution
2.1. Farmer challenges for improving water quality
Both voluntary and regulatory approaches face barriers in generating effective par-
ticipation to reduce NPS pollution. Here, I draw on agri-environmental research 
that has studied primarily commodity-focused farms that use fertilizers, pesticides, 
irrigation, soil tillage, and tile drainage, which are similar to EAA agricultural pro-
duction. Agri-environmental research has highlighted many economic and non-eco-
nomic factors that influence farmer decisions on BMP adoption (Siebert et al. 2006; 
Blackstock et al. 2010). Some water quality BMPs do provide economic benefits 
for farms, such as cost savings from reduced fertilizer use (McGuire et al. 2013). 
Other BMPs, such as the timing of planting or the use of perennial grasses, may not 
increase profitability and require subsidies (Boardman et al. 2017). A growing body 
of research shows that social concerns are important drivers of adoption and non-
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adoption. In some cases, farmers are more likely to participate in watershed-scale 
efforts to improve NPS pollution if they expect other farmers to reciprocate BMP 
adoption (Lubell 2004) and if farmers see widespread reciprocity as critical to their 
community’s “viability” (Marshall 2004, 277). Conversely, social norms can also 
create substantial barriers. Burton (2004) showed that farmer reputations – staked 
to visible signs of good farming, such as straight crop rows and high yields – can 
make it difficult to get farmers to adopt BMPs that do not fit existing social norms.
2.2. Government regulations and farmer cooperation
A major challenge for government regulations is that penalties or restrictions for 
farms may be likely to generate resentment and resistance instead of understand-
ing and engagement (Armstrong et al. 2011; Barnes et al. 2013). Pollution desig-
nations can offer one way for governments to use monitoring data and encourage 
livestock and row crop farmers to participate in watershed-scale effort (Prokopy 
et al. 2014), as well as generate awareness and dialogue about potential manage-
ment changes (McGuire et al. 2013; de Loë et al. 2015). Farmers may invoke 
questions of distributive fairness, if monitoring efforts do not clarify how much 
pollution is due to agriculture versus other sectors (Macgregor and Warren 2006). 
Moreover, existing governmental approaches, such as current European biodiver-
sity policies, are problematic because they fail to encourage farmers to cooperate 
at regional scales to deal with necessary ecosystem extent, discourage knowl-
edge exchanges between farmers that could also change social norms, and do not 
address coordination and administrative barriers (Leventon et al. 2017).
In contrast, Franks and Emery (2013) show that collective agri-environmental 
schemes for biodiversity conservation increased farmer-to-farmer learning, incentives 
for farmers to monitor each other’s efforts, and greater farmer buy-in to the scheme’s 
performance from their engagement. A few studies have shown that collective sub-
sidies, through group bidding for agro-biodiversity conservation contracts (Narloch 
et al. 2017) and through a bonus payment for meeting participation thresholds to 
reduce pesticide use (Kuhfuss et al. 2016), can be effective in increasing participa-
tion. Farmers are too often treated as homogeneous actors, while in reality tailoring 
messages to deal with diverse motivations is key to BMP adoption (Blackstock et al. 
2010). Devolving some agri-environmental contract responsibilities to a trusted inter-
mediary can reduce administrative barriers and help promote local legitimacy. For 
example, in France, a pesticide cooperative played a critical role as a credible interme-
diary in negotiating with both farmers and government agencies to reduce pesticide 
uses and garner farmer enrollment in the program. The authors identified the transition 
in underlying social acceptability as a fundamental component of widespread partici-
pation and effective water quality outcomes (Del Corso et al. 2017).
2.3. Biophysical influences on farmer collective action
In addition to economic, social, and institutional incentives, the role of local bio-
physical contexts in shaping collective action problems has not been given  sufficient 
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attention in environmental governance research (Bodin 2017). Many of the stud-
ies discussed in this background section do not address whether local biophysical 
conditions play a role in shaping perceptions that cooperation is needed, regardless 
of the type of farming operation. However, several studies have identified biophys-
ical-cooperation dynamics of agricultural water management. Marshall (2004) 
finds that a shared shallow aquifer creates a CPR dilemma for Australian farmers. 
Excessive irrigation raises the water table, which in turn causes soil salinization. 
All farmers need to reduce irrigation to minimize this shared risk to crop produc-
tion. Lansing’s (2007) study of highly interconnected irrigation canals in Bali finds 
that rice farmers flood fields at the same time to suppress pests across the system. 
Uncoordinated flooding would allow pests to move between fields and pose risks 
to all farmers. In another case, drainage infrastructure obligates row crop farmers 
to coordinate decisions on maintenance or appeal to state authorities to enforce 
changes in the common interest (Ranjan and Koontz 2018).
3. Materials and methods
3.1. Study site: regulating water management in the EAA
This case focuses on the effect of water quality restrictions governing agricul-
tural water management in south Florida’s EAA. The EAA is an administratively 
defined area based on extensive and interconnected canal infrastructure that 
provides irrigation and flood control to farms and which drains south into the 
Everglades. Six major canal arteries and large hydraulic pumps to control flow are 
Figure 1: Everglades hydrological connections.
384 Landon Yoder
owned and managed by the state, under the administration of the South Florida 
Water Management District (SFWMD) (Figure 1). Hundreds of additional pumps 
are owned by farms individually, as well as jointly through landowner-managed 
drainage districts, which are quasi-governmental entities with self-taxation pow-
ers. The EAA is home to Florida’s multibillion-dollar sugar industry. Sugarcane 
is the primary crop by acreage, accounting for 80%, while vegetables, sod, and 
rice comprise the remaining major crops (Daroub et al. 2011). There are 60 active 
farming operations. Two companies, Florida Crystals and U.S. Sugar, cultivate 
more than two-thirds of the area’s farmland. A third company, the Sugar Cane 
Growers Cooperative (hereafter Growers Coop), is comprised of 45 member 
farms and manages nearly one-quarter of the EAA. The remaining land is man-
aged by 58 other farms and businesses (hereafter Other Businesses), 11 public-
sector entities, and 37 private residences (Table 1).
In the 1980s, phosphorus pollution from EAA drainage water led to spe-
cies invasions in the Everglades. This led to a federal lawsuit against the state of 
Table 1: EAA land management based on everglades works of the district permits issued by the 
SFWMD.
Number of land managers  Total acres  Percent  Mean acres
EAA basins by acreage and land management
 EAA  157* 459,465.71  100.0  2926.53
 Fla. Crystals  1 183,905.68  40.0  –
 US Sugar  1 145,717.41  31.7  –
 Growers Coop  49** 106,205.35  23.1  2168.37
 Other businesses 58 16,951.85  3.7  292.27
 Municipal  11 6195.42  1.4  563.22
 Residential  37 445.01  0.1  12.03
Basins with a single manager
 EAA  27 247,947.22  54.0  9183.23
 Fla. Crystals  1 102,330.90  16.8  –
 US Sugar  1 77,288.43  22.3  –
 Growers Coop  22 64,483.46  14.0  2931.07
 Other businesses 3 3844.43  0.8  1281.48
 Municipal  – –  –  –
 Residential  – –  –  –
Basins with shared management
 EAA  148 211,518.49  46.0  1347.25
 Fla. Crystals  1 81,574.78  14.9  –
 US Sugar  1 68,428.98  17.8  –
 Growers Coop  42 41,766.89  9.1  852.39
 Other businesses 56 13,107.41  2.9  225.99
 Municipal  11 6195.42  1.3  563.22
 Residential  37 445.01  0.1  12.03
*Because 18 farms operate in basins with both single and shared management, the number of land 
managers listed in single and shared categories does not equal the total number of EAA land managers.
**There are four administrative units within the Growers Coop that manage land based on permit data, 
which are additional to the organization’s 45 member farms.
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Florida in 1988 for failing to uphold its water quality standards that resulted in a 
court-backed settlement.
The Florida legislature incorporated the major components of the settlement 
into the 1994 Everglades Forever Act (Rizzardi 2001; Sklar et al. 2005). The set-
tlement established stringent, long-term water quality standards of 10 parts per 
billion (ppb) of phosphorus and joint compliance for EAA farms (United States v 
SFWMD et al. 1992). Joint compliance was a concession to EAA representatives. 
To meet the restoration target, farms would adopt BMPs to minimize fertilizer 
application, soil erosion, and sediment transport through canals. Farms collective 
TP load would need to be 25% lower than their pre-regulatory load and maintained 
at that level or better each year. Compliance would be measured as water flowed 
into several stormwater treatment areas (STAs), which would further assimilate 
phosphorus before exiting into the Everglades (Figure 1).
To ensure that farms adopted BMPs effectively, the SFWMD established the 
Everglades Works of the District permitting program for EAA farms. The SFWMD 
issued permits based on where one or more farms have a diesel-powered hydraulic 
pump, which is used to raise and lower the water table for irrigation and drainage. 
The permits refer to these areas as “basins.” While not topographical, these areas 
function like river basins in that surface water flows out to SFWMD canals at a 
common point: the pump. Water management in the EAA is very interconnected. 
There are 173 basins; 44 have shared management, which accounts for 47% of the 
area’s farmland. Only nine farms operate entirely independently (Table 2). Since 
Everglades Forever Act regulations went into effect in 1994, water quality in the 
Everglades has improved from a five-year flow-weighted mean of 24 ppb from 
1979–1983 to 9 ppb from 2011–2016 (SFWMD 2017).
3.2. Data collection and analysis
First, to examine whether collective action has driven improvement in Everglades 
water quality, I perform a narrative analysis drawing 65 semi-structured  interviews. 
Table 2: Distribution of land managers in basins under single and shared water management.
Land management 
categories
Operation in single and shared management in basins
Total  Both  Single Only  Shared Only
Number of individual land managers in the EAA
 EAA  157  18  9  130
 Fla. Crystals  1  1  –  –
 US Sugar  1  1  –  –
 Growers Coop  49*  15  7  27
 Other businesses 58  1  2  55
 Municipal  11  –  –  11
 Residential  37  –  –  37
*There are four administrative units within the Growers Coop that manage land based on permit data, 
which are additional to the organization’s 45 member farms.
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The narrative analysis is based on interview responses that described or referenced 
how federal, state, and local institutions encouraged farmer  cooperation around 
water management. Interviews included 34 farmers, 11 state and federal offi-
cials, 10 EAA agricultural extension agents, and 10 additional key stakeholders. 
A census of the EAA farming operations was undertaken, while purposive sam-
pling was used to identify government, extension, and other interview subjects. 
De-identified statements favoring or disfavoring collective action are included 
in the supplementary materials. I also reviewed legal documents pertaining to 
the 1991 lawsuit settlement and 1994 Everglades Forever Act, state monitoring 
reports, and published oral and environmental histories.
Second, to examine whether collective action incentives have subsequently 
resulted in widespread improvement, I analyze publicly available state monitor-
ing and permit data. The permits require farms to submit daily monitoring data 
on drainage volumes and phosphorus concentrations, which are recorded by auto-
mated samplers at each pump. The SFWMD uses these data to calculate an annual 
per-acre TP load (called a unit area load) for each basin, which is published each 
year in the South Florida Environmental Report and includes a baseline basin 
TP load as well. I combined these per-acre numbers with the acreages managed 
by individual farms in each basin, which are listed in the permits. I then calcu-
lated projected and actual TP loads for each farm by adding together the TP loads 
across each basin in which they farm. I report a projected one-year TP load and 
a one-year average actual TP load, based on yearly South Florida Environmental 
Reports from 2001 to 2015.
While this approach does not factor trends into the analysis, such as improv-
ing or worsening loads across years, it provides a valuable snapshot of whether or 
not farms have contributed to reducing phosphorus pollution overall. I also veri-
fied and consolidated farms that are listed under different names in the permits 
but are part of the same company using Florida’s Division of Corporations online 
database. To be clear, the SFWMD does not use these basin-level data to calculate 
compliance, which is measured only at STA inflow locations. These data provide 
comparisons between basins and how basins perform over time (Adorisio et al. 
2006).
4. Compelling farmer cooperation to improve water quality
4.1. Collective action incentives from nested governance arrangements
Nested Everglades water governance creates overlapping sets of incentives 
that encourage farmer cooperation to adopt BMPs. These include the litigation 
and court-backed water quality standards that heightened farmers’ attention to 
their water management, information sharing encouraged by group compliance, 
and drainage coordination obligated by shared infrastructure and interdepen-
dent flood risks. A reasonable expectation would be that court-backed enforce-
ment and state regulations primarily drive BMP adoption. However, interview 
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responses paint a more nuanced pictured about the forms of farmer cooperation 
that underpin BMP adoption. This is especially important to understand given 
that no farm faces individual penalties under the Everglades Forever Act as 
long as the group maintains compliance, which has occurred in every year of 
the regulations.
4.1.1. Court-backed enforcement
The lawsuit created substantial fear within the farming community that their live-
lihoods were at risk because it coincided with calls from environmental groups 
and scientists to eliminate agriculture and return the EAA to wetlands to advance 
restoration (Hollander 2004). In settling the lawsuit, EAA representatives negoti-
ated to be regulated collectively rather than individually. Farmer responses show 
that a majority preferred group compliance to minimize regulatory intrusion and 
avoid in-fighting, given the substantial public criticism directed at them during the 
settlement negotiations (see also Yoder and Roy Chowdhury 2018). The choice 
to be regulated collectively represents a first form of cooperation – to deal with 
livelihood risks, rather than water quality. The outcome was an agreement where 
EAA farms would collectively reduce and maintain their TP loads 25% below a 
baseline of 1980s average loads. This would be achieved through on-farm BMP 
adoption. Individual penalties, in the form of requiring additional BMPs, would 
only be an option if the EAA became non-compliant first. Group compliance has 
been the source of criticism by environmental groups concerned that it allows 
phosphorus “hot spots” from free riding, where individual compliance would pro-
duce more rigorous adoption. The Florida Audubon Society, an influential envi-
ronmental organization, filed an administrative court petition in 2013 arguing that 
BMPs needed to be tailored to farms to maximize their effectiveness. While the 
petition was dismissed on procedural grounds, they argued that BMPs adopted 
in Everglades Works of the District permits were nearly uniform and thus under-
performing (Florida Audubon Society v. Sugar Cane Growers Cooperative of 
Florida et al. 2014).
While group compliance created the potential for free riding, given the absence 
of individual penalties, the court-backed settlement agreement also established 
stringent and specific long-term water quality standards of 10 ppb for phosphorus. 
It required 35,000 acres of farmland to be converted to STAs to perform much of 
the phosphorus reduction and mandated an “agricultural privilege tax” on EAA 
farms to pay for some of the STA construction. Over time, ongoing court rulings 
and negotiations have led to the expansion of STAs to 58,000 acres and another 
38,000 acres of farmland converted for water storage to improve STA capac-
ity and advance restoration (SFWMD 2013). While the potential for free riding 
exists, it is also clear that the loss of the area’s farming base, which could con-
tinue to diminish if the EAA became non-compliant, presents important shared 
livelihood risks to all farmers. This form of compliance, though not achieved 
through individual penalties, has been enforced through an iterative process to 
meet Everglades restoration targets.
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4.1.2. Group compliance, sharing information, and feedbacks
While the court’s enforcement provides a hammer, the Everglades Forever Act’s 
BMP regulations offer farms flexibility in deciding what BMPs they adopt. Group 
compliance has encouraged information sharing between farmers, regulators, and 
extension agents. The state legislature tasked the SFWMD with the responsibil-
ity to develop a permitting program to ensure that farmers carried out the BMP 
adoption agreed to in the settlement, but provided no further guidance. Senior 
SFWMD officials opted for a consultative approach with leaders in the farming 
community to solicit their views on what BMPs would be effective. Extension 
agents, located at the University of Florida’s Everglades Research and Education 
Center (EREC) in the EAA, also provided advice to both groups on what practices 
would reduce TP loads.
A critical outcome of these consultations was that the regulations required a 
BMP plan that targeted (1) fertilizer application, (2) soil erosion, (3) and sediment 
transport through canals. Farms were required to adopt BMPs in each category, 
but provided flexibility to choose which BMPs they felt would work best for 
their farm (Daroub et al. 2011). In reviewing permits and interviewing farmers, 
Audubon’s petition is accurate. There is relatively little variation in the types of 
BMPs that EAA farms adopt. Interview responses indicate that the consultative 
approach generated a list of socially acceptable BMPs, which lessened farmer 
resistance to adoption and mistrust of SFWMD regulators. Group compliance, 
while initially sought to maintain some autonomy from potentially prescriptive 
regulations, subsequently encouraged farmers to talk with one another about BMP 
adoption to achieve joint compliance. These interactions represent a second form 
of cooperation.
Communication has occurred through regular trainings hosted by EREC and 
the Growers Coop, with senior farm managers and executives at both Florida 
Crystals and U.S. Sugar participating as well. Early trainings involved extensive 
discussions and presentations on how to ensure BMPs were implemented effec-
tively. Trainings for new employees continue to occur twice per year. Individual 
farms also need standardized procedures for BMP implementation, given the large 
numbers of managers and employees in most farming operations. Also in response 
to the lawsuit, the large companies formed the EAA Environmental Protection 
District, a self-taxing entity to raise funds for shared research. While funds were 
initially directed at research to examine (and contest) the 10 ppb threshold (see 
Richardson et al. 2007), it has subsequently funded EREC scientists to do research 
to improve BMP effectiveness (e.g. Daroub et al. 2007).
Flexible BMP implementation and information-sharing forums are effective 
because of extensive monitoring data and the reputational meaning EAA farmers 
ascribe to it (see also Yoder and Roy Chowdhury 2018). Monitoring data provides 
critical feedbacks on water quality outcomes within the EAA. Farmers, exten-
sion agents, and regulators commented in interviews on the importance of the 
monitoring data. After the first year of the regulations, state monitoring showed 
that the EAA had collectively reduced its TP load by 60%. This result allayed 
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many  concerns that maintaining compliance would not be feasible. At the basin 
level, monitoring data showed which farms were contributing the most or least 
to improving water quality. Responses from farmers and extension agents noted 
that there was pride associated with have low TP loads and concern associated 
with increasing phosphorus levels. The published basin data showed de-identified 
permit numbers on an EAA map, which meant that farmers could recognize their 
neighbor’s performance. This also encouraged some farmers to seek out their 
neighbor to ask for recommendations on how to reduce their TP loads. Farmers 
also identified cost savings from reduced fertilizer application as one economic 
benefit from BMP adoption. At the same time, many farmers and extension agents 
commented that BMP adoption is costly. Most farmers commented that they 
would continue to do most of the BMPs even if there were no regulations, but that 
they would do some of them less frequently. This additional rigor illustrates an 
advantage of compulsory approaches over voluntary adoption.
4.1.3. Coordinating drainage decisions
While the court-back settlement and group compliance provide enforcement and 
information incentives, both governance arrangements complement pre-existing 
drainage coordination needs that EAA farms face over mutual flood risks. The 
use of shared pumps and canals interacts with the areas hydric soils to create 
interdependent consequences for managing the water table. The area’s hydric 
soils affect water management through subsurface seepage, where neighboring 
farms can cause flooding or be flooded if they raise the water table in a canal or 
field above a neighbor’s water table. This consequence is amplified because fields 
have varying soil depths, since hydric soils oxidize and subside when exposed 
to air. In the EAA, soil subsidence has occurred up to seven feet in some loca-
tions (Sklar et al. 2005). Where this becomes a serious challenge is that nearly 
half of EAA farmland is in basins with shared management – meaning there is 
one hydraulic pump for two or more farms, which ranges as high as 44 farms in 
one basin. Shared management is widespread because decades earlier many land-
owners decided to form drainage districts, which provide self-taxing authority to 
purchase pumps and dredge and maintain canals. Nine drainage districts cover 
108,000 acres across 19 basins. Yet, many additional acres involve shared pumps 
between farms. Even the largest companies, Florida Crystals and U.S. Sugar, have 
44% and 47% respectively of their farmland in basins where they share a pump 
with another farm.
Farms must communicate often when they irrigate or drain, since their deci-
sion will may affect their neighbors, regardless of whether they need agreement 
to operate a shared pump. Drainage coordination represents a third type of coop-
eration. Where the Everglades Forever Act intersected with these coordination 
challenges was through rainfall detention BMPs: the slowed velocity and reduced 
volume farms would discharge into SFWMD canals. During south Florida’s five-
month rainy season, farms can be inundated with up to eight inches of rain in a 
single day. To prevent crops from becoming flooded, farms would run their pumps 
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overnight and drain the canals empty regardless of actual rainfall, disturbing the 
sediment in the canal beds. The rainfall detention BMP required farms to coun-
ter-intuitively increase their flood risks. In the permit, each basin would choose 
whether to wait for a half inch, one inch, or 1.5 inches of rain to fall before run-
ning their pumps to drain, while also not disturbing the canal bottom. Vegetable 
operations wanted quicker drainage and opted for half-inch rainfall detention, 
while sugarcane was more flood-tolerant, so many basins with only sugarcane 
opted for one-inch detention. The few ranches in operation opted for 1.5-inch 
detention or ceased pumped discharges.
Farmers were incredibly skeptical of rainfall detention initially. Moreover, 
it had to be incorporated into existing coordination to irrigate and drain because 
of shared pumps. Several respondents explained that the coordination occasion-
ally caused some tensions and disagreement because some farms become flooded 
quicker than others. Self-monitoring is a key aspect of the interconnected canal 
infrastructure, given the need to maintain compliance and the shift in mentality. 
Even on farms with their own pump the number of employees involved means 
individual farms still need standard operating procedures around when pumping 
should occur. Yet, after the monitoring data demonstrated a substantial reduction 
in TP loads in the first year of the regulations, the tensions around the rainfall 
detention BMP lessened. The value of saving money from using less diesel fuel 
became a socially acceptable, if not preferred, rationale to justify the BMP on busi-
ness grounds. Overall, farmer collective action occurs in three ways in response to 
water quality regulations: (1) in lobbying for group compliance to protect shared 
livelihoods; (2) in sharing information to improve BMP effectiveness to maintain 
group compliance; and (3) in coordinating and regulating drainage practices.
4.2. Farm-level phosphors outcomes
While interview responses portray three ways that farmer cooperation occurs in 
nested Everglades water governance, it does not demonstrate to extent to which 
this cooperation is evident in reduced TP loads within the EAA. Comparing pro-
jected to actual TP loads among individual farming operations reveals that most 
farms are improving water quality (Figure 2). Florida Crystals and U.S. Sugar 
have the largest reductions in TP load and account for most of the improvements in 
water quality. This is unsurprising since they are the largest land managers. Within 
the Growers Coop, 33 of 49 member farms have reduced their TP loads, while 34 
of 58 Other Businesses have reduced their TP loads as well.  Also notable is that 
Florida Crystals has a per-acre average of 0.52 pounds TP, while US Sugar and 
Growers Coop members average 0.91 and 1.23 pounds of TP per acre (Figure 2). 
Not only is the Florida Crystals the largest land manager, it has much lower per-
acre averages than U.S. Sugar and many Growers Coop farms. However, there are 
10 Growers Coop farms with per-acre TP loads lower than Florida Crystals.
There are 16 Growers Coop farms and 24 Other Businesses exceeding their 
projected TP loads, which reveals that many farms still have not contributed to 
Compelling collective action 391
improving water quality. These farms generate 11% of the EAA’s overall TP load 
and have per-acre TP loads of 1.9 pounds on average. Of those, 11 Growers Coop 
farms and 23 Other Businesses have more than doubled their projected loads. This 
demonstrates a clear shortcoming of the group compliance approach. However, 
the increases could be due to changes in crop choices rather than poor manage-
ment, as vegetables generally has higher TP loads given their higher fertilizer 
requirements compared to sugarcane. The Everglades Forever Act does not regu-
late land use.
I also looked at TP load outcomes by basins, since shared water management 
is a major aspect of whether collective action is occurring or not. Basin analysis 
tells a similar story, where 128 of 173 basins (74%) have reduced their TP loads 
relative to projected amounts (Table 3). Of the 45 basins exceeding their projected 
loads, 33 basins also have per-acre loads above the EAA average of 0.98 pounds. 
Of these, five basins have per-acre loads exceeding three pounds of phosphorus, 
which is higher than the EAA’s pre-regulatory baseline average. Within these five 
basins, four have only a single manager, while the fifth basin is a drainage district 
with several dozen farms.
The presence of basins exceeding their projected TP loads is further compli-
cated by the 22 Growers Coop farms, as well as both Florida Crystals and US 
Sugar, that manage land in multiple basins where most but not all of the basins 
Figure 2: Annual TP load reductions within the EAA.
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have reduced their TP loads. All but two of these farms have generated net reduc-
tions in TP loads overall. Examining drainage districts reveals patterns that are 
similar to individual farms and basins. Of the 19 basins under drainage districts, 
12 have TP loads below projected level, while all drainage districts have per-acre 
loads below two pounds. Moreover, six of the drainage districts average TP loads 
of less than one-half pound per acre. Basin size also does not appear to be a deter-
mining factor.
4.3. Strengths and weakness of devolving BMP implementation under joint 
compliance
These findings on water quality within the EAA demonstrate that a majority of 
farms have contributed to reducing NPS pollution. This shows that devolving 
responsibility for implementation to farmers under the Everglades Forever Act’s 
shared phosphorus cap has generated widespread and effective BMP adoption. 
These outcomes are consistent with the interview responses demonstrating that a 
substantial shift in BMP adoption has occurred, which is supported by evidence 
of changes in social acceptability tied to on-farm benefits and reputational pres-
sures tied to monitoring data under group compliance. Farmer cooperation has 
played a central role in this outcome, given the importance of sharing information 
informally between neighbors, consultations with regulators in identifying effec-
tive and acceptable practices for the BMP plan, attending BMP trainings with 
EREC staff, and self-monitored rainfall detention through coordinated drainage 
decisions. However, it is important to note that this occurs through overlapping 
forms of cooperation that are not geared exclusively to improving water quality. 
Initial farmer cooperation focused on protecting shared livelihoods. Moreover, 
court-backed enforcement has reduced the area’s farming base, which is a critical 
form of compliance that is not dependent on maintaining joint compliance under 
the Everglades Forever Act.
While the majority of farms demonstrate that cooperation has played a key 
role in shifting practices, there are 40 farms and businesses and 45 basins that 
have increased their TP loads. This lends credibility to Audubon’s concerns about 
Table 3: Number of basins decreasing and increasing TP loads.
Majority land 
manager
 
 
Basins under single management  
 
Basins under shared management
Total  Decreased  Increased Total  Decreased  Increased
EAA  129  99  30  44  29  15
Florida Crystals  32  27  5  21  14  7
U.S. Sugar  26  19  7  20  14  6
Growers Coop  68  50  18  28  18  10
Other businesses 3  3  –  23  16  7
Municipal  –  –  –  20  13  7
Residential  –  –  –  11  5  6
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phosphorus hot spots and suggests that farmers are not optimizing BMP adoption 
to generate the lowest TP loads in all cases. These shortcomings are not entirely 
unexpected since interview responses from farmers and agricultural extension 
agents emphasized the costs of BMPs, despite the importance of cost savings 
from rainfall detention, soil testing, banding fertilizer, and laser-leveling fields. 
Dredging canals and removing floating aquatic vegetation would provide water 
quality benefits, according to extension agents, but are also more costly than 
beneficial to the farm business. Moreover, record-keeping and reporting are also 
additional costs tied to BMP adoption that several farmers noted make it more 
expensive to farm generally because of the labor costs involved.
At the same time, increased TP loads should be interpreted cautiously in terms 
of farm management. Many of these basins had relatively low baselines and their 
overall contribution to the EAA TP load is small. TP load increases do not neces-
sarily or conclusively represent poor management. They could represent a shift 
from sugarcane to vegetable cultivation, which are not captured by the permit 
data. Still, some type of ratcheting mechanism or incentive would appear to be a 
valuable addition to group compliance, given that STA expansion has been neces-
sary to improve their phosphorus-assimilation capacity. The five basins where TP 
loads continue to be greater than three pounds per acre, which is higher than the 
average baseline for the EAA, provides the most striking shortcoming in failing 
to improve water quality. Overall, both regulators and farmers faced substantial 
uncertainty in whether the BMP regulations would succeed. Given this uncer-
tainty, the widespread improvement across a majority of farms and basins demon-
strates an important transition to better farm management that has occurred under 
collective regulations.
5. The role of collective incentives in government regulations to 
reduce agricultural NPS pollution
Two interconnected governance challenges for agricultural NPS pollution are 
(1) the lack of locally shared consequences among farmers from their water 
management (Stern 2011) and (2) that individualized regulations can generate 
resistance rather than greater BMP adoption (Barnes et al. 2013). This study has 
demonstrated that collective regulatory incentives play a key role in tackling both 
of these problems simultaneously. The threat of livelihood risks, especially in 
the form of lost farmland, is critical to motivating farmers to opt for group com-
pliance and heightening awareness of their water management. From a theoreti-
cal perspective, this potentially substitutes for the lack of mutually experienced 
feedbacks in other common-pool resource contexts, where the consequences of 
overuse or free riding are often salient. While the lawsuit offers a (contentious) 
start, the group compliance and consultative approach between farmers, extension 
agents, and regulators draw crucially on aspects of sharing information, social 
acceptability of required practices, and farmer monitoring of rainfall detention. 
Individualized compliance and centralized rulemaking would lack these  critical 
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incentives that underpin BMP adoption. Similarly, individualized subsidies for 
voluntary-only approaches also fail to encourage farmers to work together at 
regional scales, which limits the potential for social norms to change.
Despite the improvements in Everglades water quality, the interactions 
between judicial, legislative, and local water institutions governing EAA water 
management mean the collective regulatory approach in the Everglades may 
differ substantially from other situations of NPS pollution. The dominance of a 
single industry with a reasonably flood-tolerant crop (i.e. sugarcane), the intercon-
nected drainage system and hydric soils that create interdependent water manage-
ment needs, and judicial enforcement may be unlikely elsewhere. Despite these 
context-specific elements to the Everglades, two aspects stand out as relevant to 
other agricultural NPS contexts: (1) the importance of feedbacks in making water 
quality salient and (2) processes that legitimize the need for action and increase 
social acceptance of BMP adoption.
Greater attention to and use of monitoring data is needed to make the prob-
lem of water quality salient for farmers at the farm scale, which includes demon-
strable evidence that BMPs can effectively reduce nutrient runoff without greatly 
reducing crop yields. In the EAA, the most compelling evidence was the reduc-
tions in TP loads after the first year of regulations, where crop yields were not 
diminished. This was more important than the recommendations of credible EREC 
extension agents advocating that rainfall detention would be effective. Farmers 
noted that the regulations forced them to pay closer attention to their management, 
while the basin-level monitoring provided valuable feedback on the effectiveness 
of the BMP implementation. These dynamics are consistent with the importance 
of “focusing events” that heighten awareness about water quality (Prokopy et al. 
2014) and the value of monitoring data in different forms. For example, watershed 
efforts in Australia’s Murray-Darling basin have used a water quality scorecard to 
track improvements (Patterson 2017).
The interplay between focusing events and feedbacks is an area that deserves 
further attention by researchers. At a minimum, it seems clear that focusing 
events, such as the threat of regulations, may be just as likely to secure farmers’ 
attention on how to protect their interests as improving water quality, which was 
the case in the EAA. Awareness of NPS pollution appears to be growing among 
farmers, however. Recent research indicates that 80% of U.S. farmers in Iowa 
would support making nutrient control a criterion for subsidy eligibility in U.S. 
farm policy (Arbuckle 2013). Evidence that is more specific to individual farms 
would be useful in dealing with the heterogeneity of farmers in any given commu-
nity and allow agricultural extension or agri-environmental officials to tailor their 
messages based on more specific circumstances (Blackstock et al. 2010). Where 
regulations could provide a nuanced role between untargeted voluntarism and 
inflexible, unfunded mandates would be to require farmers to trial one among sev-
eral different BMPs, such as cover crops, with some additional insurance during 
the trial period to address financial concerns around potential yield losses. This 
could provide time for farmers to see the feasibility of these practices  firsthand 
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and potentially allay fears or provide clarity on farm-specific barriers. If combined 
with collective incentives, peer-to-peer information sharing could help to improve 
knowledge around implementation and potentially lessen some resistance by pro-
viding an opportunity for social norms to adjust to new practices.
Lastly, increasing the legitimacy for and social acceptance of BMPs appears 
to be an essential component in shifting practices that current agri-environmental 
policies largely overlook. Potentially, the key aspect is legitimation, where new 
justifications are formed to make harmful practices less acceptable or needed 
changes more acceptable (Del Corso et al. 2017). For example, McGuire and 
colleagues (2013) found that farmers re-tested water quality based on their ini-
tial disbelief of a governmental pollution designation. This re-testing provided 
valuable credibility in justifying the need for reducing fertilizer application. 
Even if farmers accept the need for BMPs, adoption still needs to occur in ways 
that are socially acceptable. Burton and Paragahawewa (2011) argue that exist-
ing policies fail to draw on farmer reputations in a meaningful way. Inflexible 
prescriptions potentially undermine a key aspect of devolving implementation 
responsibility to farmers – the pride associated with demonstrating one’s skill at 
farming. In the EAA, the issues of pride and peer pressure were important moti-
vations, but which functioned alongside other socially acceptable justifications, 
such as saving money from reduced costs. Salience and legitimation offer poten-
tially generalizable findings across many agricultural contexts. Future research 
should further explore how government policies, such as collective regulatory 
approaches, could better draw on and construct common priorities within the 
farming community by addressing salience and legitimacy together to protect 
water quality.
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